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YOU CAN’T BE SERIOUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
THE LIABILITY THRESHOLD FOR DAMAGES CLAIMS 
FOR BREACH OF EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW 
AFTER THE EFTA COURT’S FOSEN-LINJEN OPINION 
 
DR ALBERT SANCHEZ-GRAELLS 
 
Abstract 
This paper offers some reflections on the position advanced by the EFTA Court that a 
simple breach of EU public procurement law is in itself sufficient to trigger the contracting 
authority’s liability in damages (Fosen-Linjen). I argue that this position is flawed 
because it deviates from previous case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(Spijker), and because it is based on interpretive errors and internal contradictions in 
the EFTA Court’s reasoning. In criticising the EFTA Court’s Judgment from the 
perspective of the harmonisation of EU law, I rely on the better view of the UK Supreme 
Court. The latter held that the liability of a contracting authority for the breach of EU 
public procurement rules under the remedies directive is assimilated to that of the State 
under the general EU law doctrine of State liability and thus requires a sufficiently 
serious breach (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority). My reflections are based on the 
need to keep procurement damages litigation constrained to its main function and limited 
to justified cases. I use this normative position to argue against the expansion of private 
enforcement of EU public procurement law as a correction of the shortcomings in its 
public enforcement. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The academic, and now also judicial, debate around the regulation of remedies for 
breach of EU public procurement law has focused on, amongst other issues, the 
contested relationship between the potential liability in damages derived from the
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Remedies Directive1 and the general principle of State liability for breaches of EU law.2 
The Remedies Directive requires Member States to grant a power to their review 
bodies or courts to ‘award damages to persons harmed by an infringement’ of relevant 
EU public procurement rules (Art 2(1)(c)). Following the principle of procedural 
autonomy, the conditions for the regulation of this right to damages are deferred to 
Member States’ legislation, subject to compliance with the general principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence.3 On its part, the principle of State liability also allows 
for damages claims due to breaches of EU law, which at least in principle covers 
procurement law despite the existence of the Remedies Directive.4 This doctrine 
(generally referred to as Francovich doctrine) requires Member States – or public bodies 
for which they are responsible,5 including the judiciary6 – to have incurred in a 
‘sufficiently serious breach’ of EU law as a condition for damages claims by the 
affected individuals.7  
The existing debate about the relationship between these two regulatory 
mechanisms boils down to disagreements over whether the Remedies Directive should 
                                                     
1 Directive 89/665/EEC on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works 
contracts [1989] OJ L395/33, as amended by Directive 92/50/EEC [1992] OJ L 209/1, and by 
Directive 2007/66/EC [2007] L 335/31 (hereinafter, the ‘Remedies Directive’). A consolidated 
version is available at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0665:20080109:en:PDF>.  
2 Following the Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 November 1991 in 
Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others EU:C:1991:428, and of 5 March 1996 in Joined 
Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame EU:C:1996:79. 
3 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 30 September 2010 in Case C-314/09 
Strabag and Others EU:C:2010:567, paras 33-34; Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union of 9 December 2010 in Case C-568/08 Combinatie Spijker Infrabouw-De Jonge Konstruktie and 
Others EU:C:2010:751, para 92. See also Steen Treumer, ‘Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement 
Rules: The State of Law and Current Issues’, in ibid & Francois Lichère (eds), Enforcement of the EU 
Public Procurement Rules (DJØF 2011) 17, 37–39. 
4 A strict position could be foreseen under a unifying thesis, where it could be argued that the 
adoption of the Remedies Directive displaced the doctrine of State liability in this area of EU 
economic law. Seemingly along these lines, see Treumer (n 3) 39. Similarly, Roberto Caranta, ‘Many 
Different Paths, But Are They All Leading To Effectiveness?’ in Treumer & Lichère (eds), Enforcement 
of the EU Public Procurement Rules (n 3) 53, 71. However, this could hardly avoid the application of the 
general principle of State liability, as would derive from a functional equivalent interpretation of 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 19 January 2010 in Case C-555/07 
Kücükdeveci EU:C:2010:21, see in particular para 27. See also Judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union of 1 March 2011 in Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and 
Others EU:C:2011:100, see in particular para 32. 
5 See Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 10 October 2017 in Case C-413/15 
Farrell EU:C:2017:745. For discussion, see Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Interesting clarification (and 
broadening) of the Foster test on 'emanation of the State' for purposes of direct effect of EU 
Directives (C-413/15)’ (howtocrackanut, 10 October 2017) 
<http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2017/10/10/interesting-clarification-of-the-foster-test-on-
emanation-of-the-state-for-purposes-of-direct-effect-of-eu-directives-c-41315?rq=farrell> accessed 16 
September 2018.  
6 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 30 September 2003 in Case C-224/01 
Köbler EU:C:2003:513; Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 13 June 2006 in 
Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo EU:C:2006:391. For discussion, from a procedural autonomy 
perspective, see Nicolo Zingales, ‘Member State Liability vs. National Procedural Autonomy: What 
Rules for Judicial Breach of EU Law’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 419. 
7 Michal Bobek, ‘The effects of EU law in the national legal systems’, in Catherine Barnard & Steve 
Peers (eds), European Union Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press 2017) 143, 170–171. 
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be constructed as a particularisation of the general principle of State liability under EU 
law (a ‘unifying thesis’) or whether a distinction should be made between ‘a public law 
of torts in the form of Member State liability, and damages for breaches of specific 
EU legislation under the effectiveness postulate (the ‘separation thesis’)’.8 The unifying 
thesis would result in the superimposition of the requirement of ‘sufficiently serious 
breach’ to the award of damages under the Remedies Directive. Conversely, the 
separation thesis would result in a free-standing interpretation of the liability threshold 
in the Remedies Directive, and possibly in a reduction of the threshold of infringement 
triggering potential liability in damages. This would aim to avoid what has been 
considered ‘the paradoxical result […] that although the remedies regime is more 
concrete and elaborate than in other areas of the law, the Court [of Justice] would be 
forced into the abstract generalities of Member State liability, rather than the 
specificities of the procurement sector’.9 This is the specific legal issue with which this 
paper is concerned. 
Interestingly, this is a systemic issue that the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) explicitly addressed in Spijker,10 when it stated that Art 2(1)(c) of the 
Remedies Directive: 
[…] gives concrete expression to the principle of State liability for loss and damage caused 
to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which the State can be held 
responsible […].11 
 
[…] as regards state liability for damage caused to individuals by infringements 
of EU law for which the state may be held responsible, the individuals harmed have 
a right to redress where the rule of EU law which has been infringed is intended to 
confer rights on them, the breach of that rule is sufficiently serious, and there is a direct 
causal link between the breach and the loss or damage sustained by the 
individuals. In the absence of any provision of EU law in that area, it is for the 
internal legal order of each member state, once those conditions have been complied with, to 
determine the criteria on the basis of which the damage arising from an infringement of EU 
law on the award of public contracts must be determined and estimated, provided the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness are complied with.12 
It is worth stressing that, in a second layer of case law, the CJEU has created additional 
specific constraints on the exercise of their procedural autonomy by the Member States 
when establishing the specific conditions for claims for damages. For example, the 
CJEU has barred the possibility of subjecting the liability in damages of a contracting 
authority to a requirement of fault or fraud,13 even if claimants can benefit from a 
                                                     
8 Hanna Schebesta, Damages in EU Public Procurement Law (Springer 2016) 8. For extended discussion, 
see ibid 65-71, in particular 67-68. 
9 ibid 71. 
10 Spijker, EU:C:2010:751. 
11 ibid para 87 (emphasis added). 
12 ibid para 92 (emphasis added). 
13 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 14 October in 2004 Case C-275/03 
EU:C:2004:632. 
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rebuttable presumption of fault.14 It has also declared the incompatibility with EU law 
of requirements that made a claim for damages conditional upon a prior finding of 
unlawfulness of the direct award of a public contract, where the action for a declaration 
of unlawfulness was subject to a six-month limitation period that started to run on the 
day after the date of the award of the public contract in question, irrespective of 
whether or not the applicant in that action was in a position to know of the 
unlawfulness affecting the decision of the awarding authority.15 CJEU case law has also 
prevented national procurement review bodies and courts from raising of their own 
motion infringements other than those supporting a claim for damages, where owing 
to the unlawfulness raised of their own motion, the court or review body would dismiss 
the action on the basis that the award procedure was in any event unlawful and the 
harm which the tenderer may have suffered would therefore have been caused even in 
the absence of the unlawfulness alleged in the claims for damages.16 The CJEU has 
imposed these additional constraints because the imposition of any such requirements 
(eg of fault, or exclusive causation) would erode the effectiveness of the right to 
damages under the Remedies Directive (Art 2(1)(c)). 
In my view, there could not be a closer formulation of the unifying thesis than 
the one formulated in Spijker,17 whereby it is clear that Art 2(1)(c) of the Remedies 
Directive fleshes out or particularises the doctrine of State liability for breaches of EU 
law in the context of public procurement.18 Moreover, nothing in the second layer of 
case law constraining the exercise of procedural autonomy by the Member States 
should be seen as potentially challenging this systemic or fundamental position. 
However, maybe surprisingly, Spijker is not (yet) universally seen as having settled the 
issue of the interaction between the grounds for actions for damages under the 
Remedies Directive and under the State liability doctrine, and some authors consider 
it irreconcilable with a reading of Strabag that would require Member States to ensure 
strict liability for breaches of EU public procurement law. In my view, those readings 
of Strabag are incorrect in that they miss the different levels of regulatory design at 
which Spijker (top layer) and Strabag (second layer) operate.19 In any case, as mentioned 
above, the main point of contention rests on what could be seen as a lex specialis 
understanding of the interaction between the two regulatory frameworks – ie a view 
                                                     
14 Strabag (n 3).  
15 Judgment of 26 November 2015 in Case C-166/14 MedEval, C-166/14 EU:C:2015:779. 
16 Judgment of 19 June 2003 in Case C-315/01 GAT EU:C:2003:360. 
17 In agreement on the positive description, but criticising it normatively, see Schebesta (n 8) 65–72. 
18 Some objections could be raised to the effect that, the Remedies Directive having been adopted in 
1989, it could not have logically given expression to the principle of State liability for breach of EU 
law, as it was only formulated in 1991 in Francovich (n 2). However, such objections can be dismissed 
on the basis of different types of arguments. A practical argument is that the Remedies Directive was 
revised in 2007, when the principle of State liability was already consolidated in CJEU case law, and 
the EU legislator did not consider it necessary to make any changes to Article 2(1)(c). A 
jurisprudential argument could also be used to dismiss the objection, on the basis that the CJEU does 
not create general principles of EU law in its case law, but rather draws from them or declares them—
which logically requires their pre-existence (arguably, from the origins of the Treaties). This is an issue 
that, however, exceeds the possibilities of this paper and, consequently, will not be assessed in any 
detail. 
19 To the same effect, see the Judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
v EnergySolutions EU Ltd (now ATK Energy Ltd) [2017] UKSC 34 per Lord Mance, at [24]. 
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that the general condition for there to be a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ of EU law 
under State liability is contrary to the requirement for strict liability for breaches of EU 
procurement law, which would have led the Remedies Directive to impose a lower 
triggering threshold by solely mentioning the need for an unqualified infringement as 
sufficient ground for damages claims (Art 2(1)(c)).20 The latter view has been reignited 
in a recent Judgment of the EFTA Court. 
In its Fosen-Linjen Judgment,21 the EFTA Court issued an important Opinion on 
the interpretation of the Remedies Directive and, in particular, on the conditions for 
the recognition of a right to damages compensation where the contracting authority 
uses an illegal award criterion and subsequently decides to cancel the tender for that 
reason.22 That is, the case concerns the existence and boundaries of the right to claim 
damages in situations where it is clear (and acknowledged by the contracting authority 
itself) that the procurement procedure was not fully compliant with substantive 
EU/EEA public procurement rules—which comes to constrain the legal analysis to 
the question whether the irregularity is such as to allow disappointed tenderers to claim 
damages compensation. These possibly exceptional circumstances make the case 
particularly relevant for the assessment of the threshold of non-compliance with EU 
law at which the contracting authorities of the Member States risk liability in damages 
vis-à-vis tenderers and potentially interested economic operators. 
The Fosen-Linjen case raised a number of issues in the six questions sent to the 
EFTA Court by the Norwegian Frostating Court of Appeal (Frostating lagmannsrett), 
such as the threshold for liability, evidentiary requirements, causation, exoneration 
causes and due diligence requirements. All of them are important but, in my view, the 
main relevance of the case concerns the threshold of liability, on which the EFTA 
Court found that: 
A simple breach of public procurement law is in itself sufficient to trigger the 
liability of the contracting authority to compensate the person harmed for the 
damage incurred, pursuant to Article 2(1)(c) of Directive 89/665/EEC, 
provided that the other conditions for the award of damages are met, including, 
in particular, the condition of a causal link.23 
The EFTA Court reached this position in answer to a series of questions and sub-
questions concerning whether liability under the Remedies Directive was conditional: 
                                                     
20 Whether this is compatible with a unifying thesis or with a separation thesis, or neither of them, 
remains unclear, but this aspect of the discussion exceeds the possibilities of this paper. 
21 Judgment of the EFTA Court of 31 October 2017 in Case E-16/16 Fosen-Linjen AS v AtB AS, 
<http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/Cases/2016/16_16/16_16_Judgment_EN.
pdf>. For discussion, see Totis Kotsonis, ‘Case E-16/16, Fosen-Linjen AS and AtB: An EFTA Court 
case clarifying key aspects of EU procurement legislation’ (2018) 27(2) Public Procurement Law 
Review NA60-NA69 <https://www.eversheds-
sutherland.com/global/en/what/articles/index.page?ArticleID=en/Competition/case-e-1616-
140218>.  
22 In Fosen-Linjen (n 21), the violation derived from the lack of verification of self-declared fuel 
efficiency information that carried a significant weight in the evaluation and assessment of the tenders. 
It was common ground that the contracting authority had violated the applicable EU procurement 
rules and their national transposition. 
23 Fosen-Linjen (n 21) para 82 (emphasis added). 
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(i) upon the contracting authority having deviated markedly from a justifiable course 
of action, (ii) upon it having incurred a material error that justified a finding of 
culpability under a general assessment, or (iii) upon it having incurred in an inexcusable 
‘material, gross and obvious error’ (question 1), or whether liability can be triggered 
under a test of ‘sufficiently qualified breach’ where the contracting authority was left 
with no discretion as to how to interpret or apply the infringed substantive rule 
(question 2). These questions thus sought clarification on how to apply the general 
requirement for a ‘substantial breach’ of EU public procurement law in the context of 
claims for damages. Surprisingly, the EFTA Court decided not to clarify how to 
interpret the requirement, but rather to exclude the applicability of the requirement 
altogether – which in my view represents an improper deviation from the CJEU Spijker 
Judgment. It is also remarkable that the EFTA Court did this despite the possibility of 
having provided a useful answer to the referring Norwegian court without engaging 
with this issue. 
Indeed, the EFTA Court decided to group the first two questions referred to it 
and address them together. In my view, this was determinative of the outcome of the 
case—ie the finding that any breach of the EU public procurement rules can trigger 
liability in damages. Had the EFTA Court addressed the questions sequentially, and 
inverting their order, it would have been possible to establish that a breach of a 
substantive provision for which interpretation and application the contracting 
authority has no discretion constitutes a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ of EU/EEA 
procurement law triggering liability (if all other requirements are met), which would 
have rendered the other issues surrounding the interpretation of the requirement of 
sufficient seriousness moot and unnecessary in this case. 
In that respect, it is worth stressing that the scope for the exercise of discretion 
in the context of procurement (which is bound to modulate the strictness of the 
liability imposed on contracting authorities, see section 3 below) was extended in the 
2014 Public Procurement Package, and that contracting authorities do enjoy a rather 
high level of executive discretion within the constraints created by Member States in 
their domestic transposition. Thus, it is hardly defensible that ‘[i]n the very detailed 
provisions contained in the public procurement directives, [a] lack of discretion is 
manifest. A simple breach of the Directives could then be “sufficiently serious”, thus 
amounting to a liability closely approaching strict liability’,24 which would erase any 
implications of the EFTA Court Fosen-Linjen Judgment. On the contrary, a significant 
number of decisions require the exercise of executive discretion and this should be 
subjected to more refined tests than considering any infringement of the directives as 
sufficiently serious per se.25 The analysis of the Fosen-Linjen case should be undertaken 
                                                     
24 Schebesta (n 8) 62. 
25 A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Hart, 2015) ch 5; ibid, 
‘Some Reflections on the ‘Artificial Narrowing of Competition” as a Check on Executive Discretion 
in Public Procurement, in Sanja Bogojević, Xavier Groussot & Jörgen Hettne (eds), Discretion in EU 
Public Procurement Law, IECL Series (Hart, forthcoming). 
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from the perspective of its intended effect: ie a reduction of the threshold of 
infringement of EU public procurement law triggering potential liability for damages.26 
By choosing not to restrict its analysis to the circumstances of the case where 
the existence of a ‘sufficiently serious’ breach of EU procurement law seemed obvious 
(even considering space for discretion27), the EFTA Court grabbed an opportunity to 
influence the development of EU/EEA law in the area of procurement remedies in a 
way that I am not sure will be productive in the long run, particularly because the rather 
extreme position taken by the EFTA Court – ie that any simple breach of EU/EEA 
procurement law suffices to generate liability for damages – was not really necessary 
under the circumstances and is at odds with the previous CJEU position in Spijker. 
This is relevant in the context of the Fosen-Linjen litigation as it reaches the Norwegian 
Supreme Court after the Frostating Court of Appeal decided not to follow the EFTA 
Court Opinion,28 which will prompt the Norwegian Supreme Court to formulate its 
own view on the issue. On this point, it is interesting to stress that, in another recent 
Judgment raising the same point of law,29 the UK Supreme Court took a diametrically 
opposing view to the EFTA Court’s and stressed the intimate interconnection created 
in the CJEU’s case law between the Remedies Directive and the general doctrine of 
State liability under EU law—thus limiting the existence of claims for damages due to 
a breach of EU public procurement law to those cases where there is a ‘sufficiently 
serious breach’. Comparing the approaches of the EFTA Court and the UK Supreme 
Court from the perspective of the harmonisation of EU law sheds some additional 
light on the flaws of the EFTA Court’s position (see section 2 below). 
Beyond the issue of conformity with prior CJEU case law and the minimum 
harmonisation approach followed by EU law in this area, in its own terms, the finding by 
the EFTA Court that a simple breach of EU public procurement law suffices to trigger 
potential liability in damages is controversial. Firstly because of the way in which the 
EFTA Court couches the deviation of liability standards under the Remedies Directive 
and under the general doctrine of State liability for breach of EU/EEA law, which 
largely rests on an excessively formal reading of the test applicable to establishing State 
liability under the evolved Francovich doctrine. Secondly, due to the fact that the EFTA 
Court engages in contradictory normative assessments – which makes the 
interpretation and operationalisation of its main finding rather tricky. In my view, these 
two points of contention make it doubtful that the CJEU – which is not bound by the 
                                                     
26 Cf speech by Carl Baudenbacher, President of the EFTA Court at the time of the Fosen-Linjen 
Judgment (n 21) (the Law Society, Competition Section, Annual Dinner, London, 22 November 2017) 
<http://communities.lawsociety.org.uk/Uploads/m/r/w/baudenbacher-speech-competition-section-
annual-dinner.pdf> accessed 16 September 2018. 
27 Indeed, the obligation to assess the requirements included in the procurement documentation is 
absolute, see Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 4 December 2003 in Case 
C-448/01 EVN and Wienstrom EU:C:2003:651 
28 The decision was adopted on 2 March 2018. I am thankful to Prof Fredriksen for bringing this to 
my attention. 
29 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (n 19). 
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EFTA Court's interpretation – will adopt the same approach in the future.30 The issues 
also merit further discussion (see section 3 below). 
The remainder of this paper offers more detailed critical reflections on the 
position advanced by the EFTA Court that a simple breach of EU public procurement 
law is in itself sufficient to trigger the contracting authority’s liability in damages. The 
next section provides positive analysis of issues around the difficult fit of the EFTA 
Court’s position with previous CJEU case law, and from the perspective of the 
harmonisation of EU law (2). The following section provides normative discussion of 
issues concerning the EFTA Court’s own understanding of the purpose of the 
Remedies Directive and internal contradictions in the reasoning adopted in Fosen-Linjen 
(3). The conclusions bring these different lines of criticism together and reflect on the 
undesirability of promoting the private enforcement of EU public procurement law 
through maximum harmonisation by a revised Remedies Directive (4). 
 
2 POSITIVE ANALYSIS: FOSEN-LINJEN DOES NOT FIT THE 
MINIMUM HARMONISATION OF PROCUREMENT REMEDIES 
 
As mentioned above, the interaction between the right to damages under the Remedies 
Directive and under the general doctrine of State liability is contested, despite the 
CJEU’s Spijker Judgment. This section adopts the perspective of the harmonisation of 
EU law to stress the intrinsic incompatibility between the configuration of the 
Remedies Directive as an instrument of minimum harmonisation and the EFTA 
Court’s position in Fosen-Linjen. The discussion relies on the UK Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, which I submit offers the proper 
interpretation of Spijker in the context of minimum harmonisation. Reflections on the 
possibility to engage in maximum harmonisation though a revision of the Remedies 
Directive are left for the conclusion (below section 4). 
 
2.1. MINIMUM HARMONISATION TRHOUGH THE REMEDIES DIRECTIVE 
 
The Remedies Directive is a minimum harmonization instrument that sets the basic 
elements of the effective and equivalent remedies that Member States must regulate 
for, in accordance with the peculiarities of their own domestic systems. This 
characterisation of the Remedies Directive is uncontroversial.31 Following the logic of 
minimum harmonization, it is possible for Member States to facilitate the existence of 
two potential tiers of remedies: a lower or more basic EU tier (subject inter alia to the 
requirement of ‘sufficiently serious breach’), and a higher or more protective domestic 
tier (subject eg to a trigger for ‘any infringement’). This higher or more protective tier 
                                                     
30 This could happen in the decision of the pending reference for a preliminary ruling in Case C-
518/17 Rudigier [2017] OJ C392/16, although the substance of the case and the way in which the 
question is put to the Court may not lead to an explicit answer on this occasion. 
31 eg Report by the European Commission on the effectiveness of the Remedies Directive concerning 
review procedures in the area of public procurement, COM(2017) 28 final at 4, <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0028&from=EN> accessed 16 
September 2018. 
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may or may not exist depending on the policy orientation of each EU/EEA State, but 
it cannot be conceptualised as a requirement of EU public procurement law on the 
basis of the Remedies Directive. This approach has both the advantage of being in 
accordance with the current state of the law as interpreted by the CJEU (as discussed 
above), and of not imposing – as a matter of legal compliance, rather than policy 
preference – an absolute harmonisation of public procurement remedies, at least as 
the threshold of liability for damages is concerned. 
To be sure, this approach is not without some relevant practical difficulties, as 
there is a thick mist of uncertainty concerning what is a sufficiently serious breach of 
procurement rules, in particular in areas of interaction between specific rules and the 
general principles of procurement – not least due to the universal application of the 
latter.32 There is also uncertainty as to what rules in the substantive EU public 
procurement directives are ‘intended to confer rights’ on the tenderers – ie the first 
Francovich condition for the recognition of State liability, which has been so far largely 
untested. Providing clarity on these issues would require a significant 
reconceptualisation of the existing CJEU case law on the interpretation of substantive 
EU procurement rules. The existence of the preliminary reference mechanism of Art 
267 TFEU could alleviate this legal uncertainty (in the long term), but not without 
creating a significant risk of collapse of the CJEU (or, at least, an even more significant 
growth in procurement-related preliminary references). From that perspective, the 
possibility to engage in maximum harmonization of remedies deserves some 
consideration (see below section 4). However, that needs to take place in the context 
of legal reform rather than as a result of judicial activism. 
 
2.2 MINIMUM HARMONISATION AS SPELLED OUT BY THE UK SUPREME 
COURT 
 
In its Nuclear Decommissioning Authority Judgment,33 the UK Supreme Court followed 
what I think is the correct reading of Spijker against the background of minimum 
harmonisation by the Remedies Directive, and established that Spijker makes clear: 
[…] that the liability of an awarding authority is to be assessed by reference to the Francovich 
conditions. Subject to these conditions being met, … [it goes] on to make clear 
that the criteria for damages are to be determined and estimated by national 
law, with the further caveat that the general principles of equivalence and
                                                     
32 Art 18 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65. Eg an open question 
concerns whether a breach of a general principle of EU public procurement law must always be 
conceptualised as a sufficiently serious breach, which would be problematic because all decisions 
taken in a procurement exercise are subject to the principles of equality, non-discrimination, 
proportionality, transparency and competition. However, its analysis exceeds the possibilities of this 
paper. 
33 [2017] UKSC 34 (n 19). As per Lord Mance, with Lady Hale and Lords Neuberger, Sumption and 
Carnwath agreeing. 
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effectiveness must also be met … Finally, [it] summarises what has gone 
before, repeating the need to satisfy the Francovich conditions.34 
More importantly, the UK Supreme Court considered that: 
[…] there is […] very clear authority of the Court of Justice confirming that the 
liability of a contracting authority under the Remedies Directive for the breach of the [public 
procurement rules] is assimilated to that of the state or of a public body for which the 
state is responsible. It is in particular only required to exist where the minimum Francovich 
conditions are met, although it is open to States in their domestic law to introduce wider liability 
free of those conditions.35 
Therefore, the UK Supreme Court followed a unifying thesis compatible with 
minimum harmonisation and took the clear view that as a matter of EU law the existence 
of grounds for an action in damages based on the Remedies Directive requires the 
existence of a ‘sufficiently serious breach’ of EU public procurement law. The UK 
Supreme Court explicitly ruled out any inconsistency between this approach and other 
case law of the CJEU, in particular Strabag, on the basis that the cases are not 
incompatible and, importantly, that the CJEU ‘in Spijker was aware of the recent 
decision in [Strabag], cited it in […] and clearly did not consider it in any way 
inconsistent with what [it] said about the general applicability of the Francovich 
conditions’.36 Importantly, the UK Supreme Court took no issue with the possibility 
for more generous domestic grounds for actions for damages.37 On the whole, the UK 
Supreme Court considered that ‘there is no uncertainty or confusion in the Court of 
Justice’s case law, and that [it is safe to rely] on the clear language and ruling in Spijker 
as settling the position, whatever may have been previous doubts or differences of 
view at national level’.38 
 
2.3 IRRECONCIABILITY OF THE FOSEN-LINJEN JUDGMENT WITH 
MINIMUM HARMONISATION 
 
In stark contrast with this approach, in its Fosen-Linjen Judgment, and despite the fact 
that similar arguments on the interpretation of Spijker were made before it (in particular 
by the Norwegian Government), the EFTA Court considered that: 
Article 2(1)(c) of the Remedies Directive […] precludes national legislation which 
makes the right to damages for an infringement of public procurement law by 
a contracting authority conditional on that infringement being culpable. […] 
The same must apply where there exists a general exclusion or a limitation of the remedy 
                                                     
34 ibid. per Lord Mance, at [23] (emphasis added). 
35 ibid at [25] (emphasis added). 
36 ibid at [24]. 
37 Although it eventually decided that this was not the case in relation to the Public Contract Regulations 
2006; see NDA, per Lord Mance at [37], with which I also agree. 
38 Ibid at [26], with reference to A Collins, ‘Damages in Public Procurement - An Illusory Remedy?’, 
in K Bradley, N Travers & A Whelan (eds), Of Courts and Constitutions. Liber Amicorum in honour of Nial 
Fennelly (Hart 2014) 339. 
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of damages to only specific cases. This would be the case, for example, if only breaches of a 
certain gravity would be considered sufficient to trigger the contracting authority’s 
liability, whereas minor breaches would allow the contracting authority to incur 
no liability […]. 
[…]A requirement that only a breach of a certain gravity may give rise to damages could 
also run contrary to the objective of creating equal conditions for the remedies available in the 
context of public procurement. Depending on the circumstances, a breach of the 
same provision of EEA public procurement could lead to liability in one EEA 
State while not giving rise to damages in another EEA State. In such 
circumstances, economic operators would encounter substantial difficulties in 
assessing the potential liability of contracting authorities in different EEA 
States.39 
This led the EFTA Court to reach the view that 
A simple breach of public procurement law is in itself sufficient to trigger the liability of the 
contracting authority to compensate the person harmed for the damage incurred, 
pursuant to Article 2(1)(c) of the Remedies Directive, provided that the other 
conditions for the award of damages are met including, in particular, the 
existence of a causal link.40 
The EFTA Court does not clearly follow either a unitary thesis with a lex specialis 
twist—whereby it would come to subsume procurement damages claims under the 
State liability doctrine, but then immediately modify it on the basis of the literal 
wording of the Remedies Directive – or a separation thesis, whereby the constraints 
of the doctrine of State liability are simply set aside in a conceptualisation of the 
Remedies Directive as creating a parallel regulatory regime. Either way, the EFTA 
Court’s position rests on an improper understanding of the level of harmonisation of 
EU law sought by the Remedies Directive. 
In my view wrongly, the EFTA Court holds the implicit understanding that the 
Remedies Directive is an instrument of maximum harmonisation when it emphasises 
its ‘objective of creating equal conditions for the remedies available in the context of 
public procurement’.41 The EFTA Court derives this objective in an earlier passage, 
where it stresses that a: 
‘[…] fundamental objective of the Remedies Directive is to create the framework 
conditions under which tenderers can seek remedies in the context of public 
procurement procedures, in a way that is as uniform as possible for all undertakings 
active on the internal market. Thereby, as is also apparent from the third and fourth 
recitals to the Remedies Directive, equal conditions shall be secured (sic)'.42
                                                     
39 Fosen-Linjen (n 21) paras 77 and 78 (emphases added). 
40 ibid para 82 (emphasis added). 
41 ibid, para 78 (emphasis added). 
42 ibid para 66 (emphasis added). 
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This is a clear judicial excess. The Remedies Directive cannot reasonably be 
considered an instrument of maximum harmonization (ie a tool that sets a ceiling, or 
even a common core of protections that must be uniformly provided in all EEA States) 
in the way the EFTA Court does. In my view, this is particularly clear from recital (6) 
of the Remedies Directive, according to which: ‘it is necessary to ensure that adequate 
procedures exist in all the Member States to permit the setting aside of decisions taken 
unlawfully and compensation of persons harmed by an infringement’43 – which the 
EFTA Court includes in its Judgment,44 but then largely ignores. 
However, the EFTA Court does have a point when it stresses that the 
divergence of rules on damages remedies can distort the procurement field and, in 
particular, discourage cross-border participation – which could be alleviated by a 
reform of the Remedies Directive to create such maximum harmonization. Such 
revision and an explicit view on the elements of a uniform system of maximum 
harmonisation could bring a much-needed clarification of the function and position 
of different types of remedies under its architecture. Notably, it would clarify whether 
damages are a perfect substitute for other remedies (as the EFTA Court seems to 
believe), or rather (solely) an ancillary remedy.45 Maximum harmonisation could also 
provide an opportunity to consider the creation of safe harbours (at least of damages 
liability) for purely procedural errors, or in the context of certain general guidelines. 
However, any and all of these reforms would require legislative intervention and, in 
my view, they are unsuitable for judicial activism. These issues are further considered 
in the conclusions (below section 4). 
 
3 NORMATIVE ANALYSIS: INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE 
EFTA COURTS’ VIEWS ON THE GOALS OF PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF EU PROCUREMENT LAW 
 
Setting aside the positive or de lege data discussion had so far, it is also worth exploring 
some of the normative positions underpinning the EFTA Court’s activism in Fosen-
Linjen, which sought to justify the deviation from the CJEU case law on the basis that 
(i) the State liability doctrine is incompatible with the special requirements of EU 
public procurement law and/or on the strength of (ii) conflicting normative 
assessments of the role for the risk of incurring liability for damages as an incentive 
for adequate legal compliance and effective performance of their procurement 
function by contracting authorities. In my view, both lines of argument are flawed. 
The first one because it relies on an excessively formalistic view of the requirement of 
subjective intent initially embedded in the State liability doctrine. The second because 
it relies on the assumption that private enforcement of EU public procurement law is 
                                                     
43 (emphasis added); note that adequate procedures are not necessarily homogeneous or identical 
procedures. 
44 Fosen-Linjen (n 21) para 3. 
45 As I posit, Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘“If it Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It”? EU Requirements of 
Administrative Oversight and Judicial Protection for Public Contracts’, in Simone Torricelli & 
Laurence Folliot-Lalliot (eds), Oversight and Challenges of Public Contracts (Brussels, 2018) 495-534. 
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and ought to be the main enforcement mechanism in this area of EU economic law. 
This section discusses both of these issues. 
 
3.1 IS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SPECIAL AND IS STATE LIABILITY SO 
SUBJECTIVE? 
 
As discussed above (sections 1 and 2), the doctrinal issues in the background of the 
discussion surrounding the threshold of liability under the Remedies Directive 
concerns its relationship with the general doctrine of State liability for breach of 
EU/EEA law. As mentioned above, the position taken by the EFTA Court in Fosen-
Linjen on this point is not very clear, but it seems to indicate that the EFTA Court 
considers that procurement law is somehow special, in a manner that could be 
compatible with either a separation thesis or a modified unitary thesis. 
Whether the Remedies Directive is seen as a particularisation of the State liability 
doctrine (unitary thesis), or as a parallel system to ensure the effectiveness of EU public 
procurement law (separation thesis) can have further normative implications 
concerning the question of the threshold for the imposition of liability on contracting 
authorities. Both theories would in the abstract seem compatible with the imposition 
of an entry threshold at ‘sufficiently serious breach’ level as a trigger for damages 
actions.46 However, the incompatibility of such an approach with a separation theory 
has been linked to the available justifications to escape liability on the basis that the 
breach does not reach the required level of seriousness. Or, in other words, on the 
assumption that strict liability needs to control this area of EU economic law. As most 
fully formulated, the separation theory seems to require the triggering of remedies at a 
lower threshold of infringement than general State liability under EU law – ie at simple 
breach – on the basis that the general theory includes an element of subjective 
assessment based on the intent of the Member States that can be too lenient, which 
would ultimately reduce the effectiveness of EU public procurement law. Indeed, it 
has been argued that under the general conditions for State liability: 
[…] the ‘mens rea’ or intention of a Member State is taken into account … By 
contrast, the type of duty and the connected justifications under the public 
procurement regime are those contained in the legislative regime. Strict 
observance of the rules is necessary, and finding a breach may not be made 
contingent on the finding of fault in the field of public procurement.47 
This approach is reflected in the EFTA Court’s Fosen-Linjen Judgment, where it 
indicates that:  
[...] it has already been established that a national rule making the award of damages 
conditional on proof of fault or fraud would make actions for damages more difficult and 
costly, thereby impairing the full effectiveness of the public procurement rules [...]. The same 
must apply where there exists a general exclusion or a limitation of the remedy 
                                                     
46 See above (n 4). 
47 Schebesta (n 8) 67–68. 
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of damages to only specific cases (sic). This would be the case, for example, if only  
breaches of a certain gravity would be considered sufficient to trigger the contracting authority’s 
liability, whereas minor breaches would allow the contracting authority to incur 
no liability.48 
In other words, the EFTA Court is not willing to tolerate a situation where what could 
be termed de minimis breaches of EU/EEA public procurement law remain 
unchallenged.49 The Court thus seems to consider that the establishment of an almost 
absolute right to claim damages is necessary to ensure the desirable effectiveness of 
EU/EEA procurement law, and seems to base this on the double rejection of (i) the 
inclusion of a subjective element in the assessment of the contracting authority’s 
behaviour, as well as (ii) conditioning the existence of a right to damages to a 
proportionality assessment derived from a requirement of seriousness of the underlying 
breach of EU public procurement law – which the EFTA Court considers functionally 
equivalent.  
However, it seems difficult to compare the subjection of damages to a subjective 
requirement of fault with the subjection of damages to an objective requirement of 
seriousness of the triggering infringement (or, in other words, a proportionality 
assessment). As mentioned above, because these requirements are operationalised at 
different layers of the architecture of damages in procurement. Additionally, because 
it pitches two different issues against each other: one, of an objective nature (sufficient 
seriousness) and the other of a subjective nature (fault), which can also carry very 
relevant differences in their discoverability and the linked burden of proof. In that 
regard, the rhetorical strategy employed by the EFTA Court in identifying risks of 
ineffectiveness linked to ‘a general exclusion or a limitation of the remedy of damages 
to only specific cases’ artificially inflates the problem of the requirement of seriousness 
in the breach without recognising that this is exactly the rule that applies in every 
setting where strict or objective liability does not apply50 – and that, logically, strict 
liability is compatible with a requirement of seriousness, as strict liability is not the 
same as unconstrained or total liability. 
The EFTA Court also considers that: 
‘[a] requirement that only a breach of a certain gravity may give rise to damages 
could also run contrary to the objective of creating equal conditions for the 
remedies available in the context of public procurement. Depending on the 
circumstances, a breach of the same provision on EEA public procurement 
could lead to liability in one EEA State while not giving rise to damages in 
another EEA State’. 
  
                                                     
48 Fosen-Linjen (n 21) para 77 (emphasis added). 
49 In that regard, the Court seems to have been influenced by the European Commission’s position 
that ‘any infringement of public procurement law should be followed up and should not be left 
unattended because the breach is not “sufficiently serious”’; Fosen-Linjen (n 21) para 59. 
50 Cf Kotsonis (n 21) text accompanying footnote 29. 
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However, this is by no means obvious, in particular if the preliminary reference 
mechanism works appropriately.51 
This approach is objectionable on several grounds. To begin with, even if it is 
generally accepted that procurement remedies cannot be subjected to a requirement of 
fault,52 that does not mean that actionable damages under the Remedies Directive need 
to be exempted from the conditions of the general State liability doctrine. In particular, 
because the evolution of the State liability doctrine has clearly resulted in its 
objectification and given rise to a consistent practice where the subjective element of 
a breach of EU law is not taken into account.53 As is well known, under the doctrine 
of State liability for breach of EU law,54 the CJEU defined a broad test to assess 
whether an infringement of EU law is ‘sufficiently serious’.55 This was first fully 
enounced in Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III,56 and has then been progressively refined 
in the case law of the CJEU. The test was designed in the following terms: 
[…] finding that a breach of [Union] law is sufficiently serious is whether the 
Member State … concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its 
discretion. The factors which the competent court may take into consideration 
include the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion 
left by that rule to the national … authorities, whether the infringement and the damage 
caused was intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or 
inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a [Union] institution may have 
contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of national 
measures or practices contrary to [Union] law.57 
In subsequent case law, the CJEU has stressed that the: 
[…] condition requiring a sufficiently serious breach … implies manifest and 
grave disregard by the Member State for the limits set on its discretion, the 
factors to be taken into consideration in this connection being, inter alia, the 
degree of clarity and precision of the rule infringed and the measure of 
                                                     
51 ibid para 78. 
52 Strabag (n 3). See also Case C-275/03 Commission v Portugal EU:C:2004:632. 
53 Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Assessing the Public Administration’s Intention in EU Economic Law: 
Chasing Ghosts or Dressing Windows?’ (2016) 18 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 93, 116–
119. 
54 For general discussion, see Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law. Texts, Cases and Materials, 6th 
edn (Oxford University Press, 2015) 257–61. 
55 This requirement has been found to be the most difficult condition for a claimant to establish in a 
State liability case; see the T Lock, ‘Is Private Enforcement of EU Law through State Liability a Myth? 
An Assessment 20 Years after Francovich’ (2012) 49 (5) Common Market Law Review 1675, 1693. 
56 Brasserie du Pêcheur (n 2). 
57 ibid paras 55 and 56 (emphasis added). See also Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union of 4 July 2000 in Case C-424/97 Haim EU:C:2000:357; and of 4 December 2003 in C-63/01 
Evans EU:C:2003:650. 
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discretion left by that rule to the national authorities.58 
[Additionally,] where at the time when it committed the infringement, the 
Member State in question […] had only considerably reduced, or even no, 
discretion, the mere infringement of [Union] law may be sufficient to establish 
the existence of a sufficiently serious breach.59 [Consequently,] the Member 
State’s discretion, which is broadly dependent on the degree of clarity and 
precision of the rule infringed, constitutes an important criterion in determining 
whether there has been a sufficiently serious breach of [Union] law.60 
At first reading, the inclusion of a subjective element (‘whether the infringement … 
was intentional or involuntary’) amongst the conditions that can be taken into 
consideration to determine whether an infringement of EU law is ‘sufficiently serious’ 
seems to create a clash with the need to exclude any element of fault in the regulation 
of remedies for infringements of EU public procurement law. However, a closer look 
at the case law of the CJEU and its evolution shows that this element has not been 
given significant weight in the application of the State liability doctrine.61 Given that 
State liability ‘cannot be made conditional upon fault (intentional or negligent) on the 
part of the organ of the State responsible for the breach, going beyond that of a 
sufficiently serious breach of [Union] law’,62 there has been no relevant assessment of 
subjective elements in the behaviour of the public administration at the point of 
engaging State liability.63  
The assessment of the sufficient seriousness of the breach of EU law by the 
Member State has been objectified and redirected towards an analysis of its respect to 
the limits of whatever levels of discretion it enjoyed under the relevant provisions. 
Where there is no discretion, the assessment of intention becomes totally irrelevant. 
Indeed, where the CJEU had the necessary information to apply the test and determine 
whether the facts must be held to constitute a sufficiently serious breach of Union law 
                                                     
58 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 25 January 2007 in Case C-278/05 
Robins and Others EU:C:2007:56, para 70; of 16 October 2008 in Case C-452/06 Synthon 
EU:C:2008:565, para 37; and of 19 June 2014 in Case C-501/12 Specht and Others EU:C:2014:2005, 
para 102. 
59 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 23 May 1996 in Case C-5/94 The Queen 
v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) EU:C:1996:205, para 28; of 8 
October 1996 in Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94 and C-188/94 to C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others 
EU:C:1996:375, para 25, and of 18 January 2001 in Case C-150/99 Stockholm Lindöpark EU:C:2001:34, 
para 40. See also Robins (n 58) para 71; Synthon (n 58) para 38. 
60 Synthon (n 58) para 39. See, to that effect, Robins (n 58) paras 72 and 73. 
61 See Takis Tridimas, ‘Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing Down?’ 
(2001) 38 (2) Common Market Law Review 301, 310. For discussion, see Julio Baquero Cruz, 
‘Francovich and Imperfect Law’ in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Loic Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of 
EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 2010) 418, 423 
ff. 
62 Brasserie du Pêcheur (n 2) para 80. The situation is different when it comes to the liability of EU 
institutions, where the case law regarding fault requirements is much less clear. See Pekka Aalto, Public 
Liability in EU Law: Brasserie, Bergaderm and Beyond, Modern Studies in European Law (Hart, 2011) 47-
51. 
63 Indeed, there is a distinction between establishing liability independently of intention and then 
imposing a remedy that takes intention into account. This can be particularly relevant in relation to 
compensation claims. 
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in a case where the competent national institution had no substantive choice, the CJEU 
did not assess whether the infringement was intentional or involuntary and simply 
relied on the objective situation created by the public administration concerned.64 
Where there is very limited discretion, the CJEU does not engage in any subjective 
assessment either and applies a test of strict liability.65 Where there is broader 
discretion, the analysis revolves around the clarity and precision of the rule infringed, 
and the CJEU tends to restrict its analysis to an objective assessment of whether the 
interpretation followed by the Member State was reasonable or excusable, but it does 
not delve into subjective assessments.66  
Moreover, the more recent case law of the CJEU on liability derived from judicial 
breaches of EU law can provide some additional support to the claim that, generally, the 
test applicable under the second condition of the State liability doctrine does not give 
any significant weight to the subjective element requiring a determination of whether 
the infringement was intentional or involuntary – or, in other words, that the 
assessment needs to be reconfigured as an objective test. In that regard, even if it has 
shown some deference towards infringements of EU law by national courts, as 
compared to infringements by the executive or the legislator,67 the CJEU still has 
rejected the limitation of State liability to cases of intentional fault and serious 
misconduct on the part of the court, and stressed that 
[…] although it remains possible for national law to define the criteria relating 
to the nature or degree of the infringement which must be met before State 
liability can be incurred for an infringement of [Union] law attributable to a 
national court adjudicating at last instance, under no circumstances may such 
criteria impose requirements stricter than that of a manifest infringement of 
the applicable law.68 
In view of all the above, it seems clear that the subjective element that can, in principle, 
be taken into consideration under the second condition for State liability not only has 
not played any significant role so far, but it cannot do so in the future because Member 
States cannot impose fault-based requirements stricter than a test of manifest 
infringement of the applicable law.69 It is submitted that this erodes, if it does not 
complete eliminate, any inconsistency with the need to ensure that the same objectified 
approach controls the regulation of public procurement remedies – thus significantly 
damaging the foundations of the reasoning of the EFTA Court in Fonsen-Linjen.  
 
                                                     
64 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 28 June 2001 in Case C-118/00 Larsy 
EU:C:2001:368, paras 39 ff. 
65 Synthon, (n 58) paras 41 to 43. 
66 Robins (n 58) paras 78 to 82. In less clear terms, Case C-501/12 Specht, para 103. 
67 For discussion of the standard, see Björn Beutler, ‘State Liability for Breaches of Community Law 
by National Courts: Is the Requirement of a Manifest Infringement of the Applicable Law an 
Insurmountable Obstacle?’ (2009) 46 (3) Common Market Law Review 773. Cf Nicolo Zingales, 
‘Member State Liability vs. National Procedural Autonomy: What Rules for Judicial Breach of EU 
Law?’ (2010) 11 (4) German Law Journal 419. 
68 Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo, EU:C:2006:391, para 44. 
69 Köbler (n 6) paras 53 to 56. 
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Moreover, in my opinion, the EFTA Court’s general line of reasoning against 
the tolerance of ‘non-persecuted’ breaches of EU public procurement law conflates 
two separate issues. First, whether any infringement of EU/EEA substantive law 
should trigger a ground for the review of the procurement decision concerned and, if 
justified, to set it aside. Second, whether any infringement of EU/EEA substantive 
law should provide a right to claim damages. This is once more based on a very formal 
reading of Strabag, where the CJEU indicated that: 
 ‘the remedy of damages […] can constitute, where appropriate, a procedural alternative 
… only where the possibility of damages being awarded in the event of 
infringement of the public procurement rules is no more dependent than the other 
legal remedies … on a finding that the contracting authority is at fault’.70  
However, this does not mean that damages and other remedies must be absolutely 
interchangeable and always subjected to the same conditions. It simply implies that, 
the same way that other remedies cannot be conditional upon a requirement of fault, 
neither can damages claims. This is uncontroversial, but hardly a good reason to 
consider that all remedies must be subjected to a trigger of simple breach of EU public 
procurement law.  
By conflating both issues, the EFTA Court implicitly assumes that claims for 
damages are the only effective remedy, or that they can only be an effective remedy 
where they are equally available as other remedies (such as declarations of 
infringement, or the setting-aside of procurement decisions). In doing that, the Court 
does not take into account the existence of public oversight mechanisms able to ‘pick 
up’ on those de minimis infringements of EU/EEA public procurement law, and seems 
not to think it possible for disappointed tenderers to exercise rights of review in the 
absence of the financial incentives resulting from damages claims. This comes both to 
establish a hierarchy of remedies that is absent in the Remedies Directive,71 and to 
create the same risk of deformation of EU tort law that we have witnessed in other 
areas of EU economic law.72 Moreover, this does not take into account important 
issues of balance in the public and private enforcement of EU economic law, which 
can hardly be properly addressed through piecemeal evaluation of different aspects of 
the system.73 These are important issues of design of the overarching architecture for 
the enforcement of EU public procurement law, and they are further discussed in the 
conclusion (see below section 4). 
  
                                                     
70 Strabag (n 3), para 39 (emphasis added). 
71 Sanchez-Graells (n 45). 
72 See Okeoghene Odudu & Albert Sanchez-Graells, 'The interface of EU and national tort law: 
Competition law', in Paula Giliker (ed), Research Handbook on EU Tort Law (Edward Elgar 2017) 154–
183; as well as the rest of contributions to that volume. 
73 Acknowledgedly, a problem that also affects the way in which preliminary references to the CJEU 
operate. However, an assessment of this issue exceeds the possibilities of this paper. 
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3.2 NORMATIVE CONTRADICTIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CONTRACTING AUTHOTITIES AND TENDERERS 
 
As mentioned above, one of the important normative aspects on which the EFTA 
Court built its Fosen-Linjen Judgment concerns the incentives that different liability 
thresholds and requirements create for contracting authorities and economic 
operators. In that regard, the Court seems to adopt two contradictory normative 
standpoints in dealing with the twin question of the threshold for liability and the 
causality requirement – which are indivisibly interlinked in its overall finding that 'A 
simple breach of public procurement law is in itself sufficient to trigger the liability ... provided that 
the other conditions for the award of damages are met, including, in particular, the 
condition of a causal link’.74 The contradiction is as follows. 
On the one hand, the EFTA Court considers that a simple infringement of 
EU/EEA public procurement rules must suffice to trigger liability because: 
[…] damages seek to achieve a three-fold objective: to compensate for any losses 
suffered; to restore confidence in the effectiveness of the applicable legal 
framework; and to deter contracting authorities from acting in such a manner, which will 
improve future compliance with the applicable rules. Liability through damages may also 
provide a strong incentive for diligence in the preparation of the tender procedure, which will, 
ultimately, prevent the waste of resources and compel the contracting authority to 
evaluate the particular market’s features. Were liability to be excluded, this may 
lead to a lack of restraint of the contracting authority.75 
Thus, in this part of the Judgment, the EFTA Court considers a high likelihood of 
liability in damages a proper incentive for adequate diligence and decision-making on 
the part of the contracting authority. Conversely, when assessing the causality 
requirements for the recognition of a right to damages compensation (in the context 
of the fourth question referred by the Norwegian court), the EFTA Court stresses 
that: 
 
[...] there must be a balance between the different interests at stake. While 
liability of the contracting authority for any errors committed promotes, in 
principle, the overall compliance with the applicable legal framework, exaggerated 
liability of the contracting authority could lead to excessive avoidance costs, reduce the flexibility 
of the applicable framework and may even lead to the unjust enrichment of an unsuccessful 
tenderer. Furthermore, excessive liability may provide an incentive for a contracting authority 
to complete award procedures, that were evidently unlawful, or impinge upon the freedom to 
contract’.76 
 
                                                     
74 Fosen-Linjen (n 21) para 82 (emphasis added). 
75 ibid para 76 (emphasis added). 
76 ibid para 101 (emphasis added). 
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This clearly indicates that the existence of liability needs to be constrained or 
modulated. The EFTA Court seems to want to do so by establishing a complicated 
approach to causality requirements that would distinguish between those applicable to 
claims for negative and positive damages (ie bid costs and loss of profits). This may 
have been justified due to the peculiarities of the Norwegian tort law system, but it is 
difficult to square with the general mechanism of liability in damages under EU law. 
Moreover, even in the context of the first question, the EFTA Court had already 
shown some inconsistency when establishing that: 'a claim for damages can only 
succeed if certain other conditions are fulfilled, such as the condition that there must be 
a sufficient causal link between the infringement committed and the damage incurred'77 
–  which, however, is not equally reflected in the wording of its general finding, which 
only makes reference to 'the condition of a causal link'.78 What the EFTA Court 
intended with the qualifier of ‘sufficient’ causal link, and how this results in a functional 
approach that materially differs from the requirement of a ‘serious’ rather than a 
‘simple’ breach is left unexplained. 
In my view, the approach (implicitly) followed by the EFTA Court is not better 
than the alternative approach of having closely stuck to a requirement for a sufficient 
breach of EU/EEA public procurement rules. Even if a combination of low liability 
threshold (simple breach) and high causality requirements ('sufficient causality') could 
lead to the same practical results that a requirement for 'sufficiently serious breach' 
(with simple causation analysis), the EFTA Court’s approach creates legal uncertainty 
and more scope for divergence across EU/EEA jurisdictions, not the least because 
causation is within the remit of domestic law.79 In addition, it comes to preclude one 
of the mechanisms built into EU law – in particular the doctrine of State liability—to 
mitigate its effects. This is done by requiring both sufficiently seriousness of the breach 
and direct causality in the creation of the recoverable damage. By suppressing the first, 
the EFTA Court Fosen-Linjen Judgment places all pressure on the causality mechanism, 
which can also have distortive effects if existing causality tests need to be adapted to 
compensate for the suppression of the other check of the system. More importantly, 
this approach can create a wave of litigation based on any (minimal, formal, irrelevant) 
errors in the conduct of procurement procedures in an attempt to test the boundaries 
of the trigger for liability in damages. 
On the whole, it would have been preferable to stick to the general framework of 
the State liability doctrine as specified in the Remedies Directive, which is compatible 
with a finding of a requirement for there to be a 'sufficiently serious breach' of 
EU/EEA procurement law and, at the same time, with a finding that breaching a 
provision for which interpretation and application the contracting authority has no 
discretion (eg the obligation to be in a position to verify the content of tenders against 
its requirements and award criteria, as in Fosen-Linjen) suffices to trigger liability (the 
same way that the mere lack of transposition of a Directive triggers State liability under 
the general test). 
                                                     
77 ibid para 81 (emphasis added). 
78 ibid para 82. 
79 Cf Kotsonis (n 21) text accompanying footnote 32. 
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For all the reasons discussed so far, it seems clear that the EFTA Court’s Fosen-
Linjen Judgment is not reflective of the state of EU public procurement law, but rather 
an exercise of judicial activism aimed at pursuing a particular understanding of the 
need for and role of private enforcement through damages claims. The EFTA Court 
seemed to find the current approach based on minimum harmonisation and the 
subjection of damages claims to the pre-existence of sufficiently serious breaches of 
EU public procurement law unsatisfactory, and it took it upon itself to push for a 
change of this situation. In my view, it did so improperly, for the reasons already 
discussed.  
Trying to bring the different strands of the discussion together, in the following 
conclusions, I reflect on whether the discontent with the EU public procurement 
damages system underlying the Fosen-Linjen case could be addressed through a reform 
of the Remedies Directive aimed at maximum harmonisation, as well as on whether a 
significant boost of private enforcement of EU public procurement law would be 
desirable. 
 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
As has emerged from the previous discussion, and beyond the issue of the more than 
difficult fit of the Fosen-Linjen Judgment with the previous CJEU case law, and in 
particular Spijker, most of the normative reasons provided by the EFTA Court to 
support the position that a simple breach rather than a sufficiently serious breach of EU 
public procurement law should trigger potential liability in damages involve arguments 
concerning the need to increase legal certainty through higher levels of harmonisation 
(ie maximum harmonisation) as well as the need to facilitate the private enforcement 
of EU public procurement rules to increase their effectiveness. In this concluding 
section, I partially take issue with both claims. 
Firstly, the EFTA Court seems to assume that designing an EU/EEA wide 
maximum harmonisation set of rules for the award of damages in the context of public 
procurement is not only desirable, but also (relatively easily) feasible. Even if it was 
accepted that maximum harmonisation was desirable, and despite the potential 
advantages derived from a revision of the system to achieve maximum harmonization, 
given the vast differences in the rules on damages claims across EU jurisdictions, it 
would be certainly difficult, if not outright impossible, to reach an agreement on the 
adequate level of protection and the relevant procedural mechanisms.80 This is not 
unique to public procurement, but reflects more broadly the difficulties in the 
approximation of private law within the EU/EEA. Given these practical difficulties, I 
would not think the European Commission would be willing to engage in the exercise 
                                                     
80 For comparative discussion, see for example, the contributions to Treumer & Lichère (eds), 
Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules (n 3), and to Duncan Fairgrieve & Francois Lichère (eds), 
Public Procurement Law. Damages as an Effective Remedy (Oxford, Hart 2011); see also Schebesta (n 8) 75–
154. See also the contributions to Torricelli &Folliot-Lalliot (eds), Oversight and Challenges of Public 
Contracts (n 45), although these are mainly focused on administrative law aspects of the domestic 
transposition of the Remedies Directive. 
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of designing such maximum harmonization mechanisms, even if it decided to propose 
a revision of the Remedies Directive in the future. What then should not be acceptable 
is for such maximum harmonisation to be achieved or imposed through an excessively 
broad interpretation of the Remedies Directive as, in my view, the EFTA Court's Fosen-
Linjen judgment does. 
Moreover, I think it is worth stressing that, in addition to the practical difficulties 
derived from the dispersion of solutions implicit in the current minimum 
harmonization of procurement remedies, and the not smaller difficulties in attempting 
a maximum harmonization, there are also structural tensions in the use of damages 
actions for the enforcement of EU public procurement rules. As recent research has 
clearly shown,81 the use of damages actions (either based on Francovich liability, or 
sector-specific rules) for the enforcement of substantive EU law creates distortions in 
the domestic legal systems of the Member States. From that perspective, both the 
minimum and maximum harmonization approaches are problematic. 
From the minimum harmonization perspective, because the existence of two tiers 
of protection at domestic level (on enforcing the EU standard and a potential second 
tier enforcing more demanding rules) can also result in two tiers of regulation and/or 
case law concerning the interpretation and application of the rules, which is bound to 
create legal uncertainty. For example, if issues around the effectiveness of the remedy 
in the EU-tier create pressures on the interpretation of the domestic-tier remedies as 
a result of reverse pressures resulting from the principle of equivalence – ie the 
domestic remedy can hardly be both broader in scope and less effective in its 
consequences. 
From the maximum harmonization perspective, because the creation of a one-size-
fits-all remedy (such as that derived from the lower threshold for damages liability in 
the EFTA Court’s Judgment) can have rather drastic impacts for some Member States 
(in particular, those without a ‘higher-tier’ domestic protection). Those impacts could 
be felt not only in the area of procurement law, but also in other areas of (economic) 
law which regulation and case law can be distorted as a result of the EU rules. For 
example, establishing a lower trigger of potential liability in damages for the breach of 
procurement rules than that applicable under the State liability doctrine in relation to 
general internal market law could create significant pressures on the interpretation of 
the ‘concept’ of procurement as litigants sought to fit different types of market-
regarding public activity within the context of procurement.82 
More generally, it is worth emphasising that there will be issues of (non)compliance 
with the EU public procurement rules that may be ill-suited for damages claims, and 
that there is a clear difficulty in assuming that generous procurement damages rules 
are in the public interest, given that all pay-outs reduce the funds available for the 
discharge of public sector obligations – in a notable difference with damages in other 
areas, such as EU competition law. This requires Member States to retain (or create) a 
                                                     
81 Giliker (n 72). 
82 It is worth noting that the concept of procurement is triggering significant litigation already; see eg 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 2 June 2016 in Case C-410/14 Falk 
Pharma EU:C:2016:399. See also Opinion of AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona of 13 December 2017 in 
Case C-9/17 Tirkkonen EU:C:2017:962 (not available in English). 
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robust public enforcement mechanism. This was one of the missed opportunities in 
the revision of the EU public procurement rules in 2014,83 but the perceived weakness 
of the public enforcement mechanisms cannot be compensated with a boost of private 
enforcement through distortive adaptations of general EU law doctrines (State liability) 
and/or domestic private law institutions (mainly tort law). 
Thus, it seems adequate (and it may not be too late…) to reconsider a drastic 
change in the enforcement strategy to reduce the current over-reliance on tenderer-led 
administrative and/or judicial reviews, and to start to move away from damages-
fuelled private enforcement of EU public procurement law and towards a more robust 
architecture of public enforcement with a restriction of damages compensation solely 
in exceptional cases – certainly where that compensation goes beyond direct 
participation costs. Discussing the possibilities of doing so and the challenges it implies 
far exceeds the possibilities of this paper, but given that reaching a ‘happy median’ in 
the regulation of (private) damages actions in the context of procurement remedies in 
the EU would not be a minor feat, it may be time to (re)open the discussion. 
                                                     
83 Pedro Cerqueira Gomes, ‘A Lost Proposal in the 2014 Public Procurement Package: Is there any 
Life for the Proposed Public Procurement Oversight Bodies?’ in Grith Skovgaard Ølykke & Albert 
Sanchez-Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar, 2016) 
170–190. 
